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THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW: THE 
END OF HISTORY OR A NEVER-ENDING STORY? 
Franklin A. Gevurtz* 
Abstract: Considerable scholarship during the last few decades addresses the question of 
whether corporate laws are becoming global by converging on commonly accepted 
approaches. Some scholars have asserted that such convergence is occurring around the most 
efficient laws and institutions, thereby marking the “End of History” for corporate law. This 
Article responds to such assertions by developing three claims not previously given due 
attention in the convergence literature. First, it demonstrates that the history of corporations 
and corporate law has been one of seemingly constant movement toward global convergence, 
yet the resulting convergence is always incomplete or transitory. Next, it points out that 
because forces besides efficiency also produce convergence, convergence often occurs 
around corporate laws and institutions that have no particular efficiency or other normative 
advantage, or that necessarily represent stable equilibrium points. Finally, the Article asks 
what are the important corporate laws and institutions by which to measure the extent of 
convergence at any one time. It develops the answer that a stable convergence is least likely 
for the most important corporate law issues, which are characterized by tensions between 
competing policies and no easy solutions for the problems presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While corporations, at least the largest ones, commonly operate on a 
global scale, the laws governing their internal affairs (in other words, the 
rights and duties of their owners and managers) are national or sub-
national.1 In the last few decades, considerable scholarship has focused 
on whether these national and sub-national corporate laws are becoming, 
like many of the corporations they govern, global—in this case by 
converging upon commonly accepted approaches.2 Earlier comparative 
corporate law scholarship was to a great extent a technical affair, 
occupied with describing differences in specific rules—e.g., whether a 
nation’s corporate law provided for a one- or two-tier board of 
directors3—and lacked any overarching purpose or direction motivating 
its inquiry.4 This changed when scholars began to look at a broader 
context, which culminated in the convergence predictions. 
The broader inquiry culminating in predictions of convergence has 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 
531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). But see Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155 (noting that corporate laws of European Union 
member nations are subject to corporate law harmonizing directives issued by the European 
Council). 
2. E.g., JEFFREY N. GORDON & MARK J. ROE, CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2004) (collected essays); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Douglas M. 
Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 327 (2001); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative 
Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross-Reference, 38 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects 
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 
(1999); Klaus Gugler et al., Corporate Governance and Globalization, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 129 (2004). 
3. See, e.g., ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 75–93 (1976).  
4. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
in GORDON & ROE, supra note 2, at 128 (“This area of scholarship had been largely the domain of 
taxonomists . . . .”). 
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both descriptive and normative aspects. The descriptive aspect 
commonly begins with an observation about the pattern of shareholdings 
in the United States and England as contrasted with the pattern found in 
most of the rest of the world.5 Specifically, the largest corporations in 
the United States and England commonly have widely dispersed 
shareholdings in which no shareholder or cohesive group of shareholders 
holds enough stock to control the corporation; in contrast, in many other 
parts of the world, a relatively few shareholders will hold large enough 
blocks of voting shares to possess effective control over even the largest 
companies.6 This, as well as other differences between corporations of 
different nations, fuels the following normative inquiry: do such 
differences produce superior performance for corporations from one 
nation versus another (which presumably translates into superior overall 
economic performance)?7 Bringing the matter back to law, the 
descriptive and normative questions then become whether various 
corporate or other legal rules and institutions facilitate dispersed or 
concentrated shareholdings (or other differences encountered in 
corporations from different nations), and thereby lead to improved 
individual corporate and overall economic performance.8 
The answers reached to these inquires tend to depend on the decade. 
In the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese and German 
economies and companies were outperforming the economy and 
companies in the United States. Accordingly, scholarship noted the 
advantage of more concentrated shareholdings in disciplining or 
otherwise providing better incentives for corporate managers.9 Scholars 
also noted the apparent advantage that systems for greater employee 
involvement in corporate decisions, as were found in Japan and 
Germany, possessed in producing better, and better implemented, 
corporate business practices.10 The question became what laws and 
                                                     
5. E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from Australia, 16 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 13, 15–18 (2002).  
6. Id. Of course, there are also many large corporations in the United States and England 
controlled by one or more shareholders holding large blocks of stock. 
7. E.g., Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing But Wind”? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 83–84 (2011); Gugler et al., supra note 2; Bratton & 
McCahery, supra note 2, at 235. 
8. E.g., Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000); La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Coffee, supra note 2, at 644. 
9. E.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1 
(1990) (discussing the advantage of banks as shareholders in Japanese companies in monitoring 
management). 
10. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 4, at 131–32 (discussing the theory that an implicit lifetime-
employment guarantee in Japanese companies led to production advantages).  
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institutions were needed in the United States to make our corporations 
function more like Japanese and German corporations.11 In the later 
1990s, superior economic and corporate performance shifted to the 
United States. Accordingly, scholarship presumed the virtues of 
dispersed ownership in raising capital, promoting high technology start-
ups, and facilitating management discipline through the threat of hostile 
takeovers12—and also recognized the dark side of more concentrated 
ownership as illustrated in the Asian Financial Crisis.13 The question 
correspondingly became what laws and institutions other nations should 
develop to promote dispersed shareholdings as in the United States.14 
These discussions in turn led to an additional question with both 
descriptive and normative aspects: if, indeed, a set of corporate practices 
and legal rules exist that produce better corporate and overall economic 
performance in every nation, will the corporate laws and practices in 
various nations not ultimately converge upon these laws and practices to 
create a global corporate law?15 The normative implications of an 
affirmative answer are that individual national efforts to resist this 
convergence are both misguided and futile. Among the scholars reaching 
the conclusion that convergence toward superior corporate law and 
institutions is occurring, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman may have 
been the most provocative in their assertion at the beginning of the new 
century that we had reached “The End of History for Corporate Law.”16 
Hansmann and Kraakman claimed that corporate law had converged a 
century earlier on the essential features of corporations, and now, after a 
century of experimentation, had solved the remaining critical issues by 
                                                     
11. E.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (1990); 
Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 65. 
12. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial 
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
73 (1995); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture 
Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865 (1997). 
13. E.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia (Dec. 9, 
1999) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_ id=202390; Simon 
Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis (Nov. 15, 1999) (working 
paper), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39681/3/wp297.pdf 
(expropriation of firm assets at the expense of minority shareholders and creditors was a major 
contributing factor to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998). 
14. E.g., David Chiang, Asia’s Corporate Governance Revolution, WALL ST. J. (Asia), June 24, 
1999, at 8; Geoffrey Owen, The Americanization of European Business, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), July 28, 
1999, at 14. 
15. See supra note 2. 
16. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439 (2001). 
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converging on a so-called standard shareholder-oriented model—thereby 
rejecting manager-, labor-, or state-oriented models. 
The ensuing decade, bookended by major corporate scandals and 
corresponding stock- and financial-market collapse, has not treated 
kindly the thesis that we have reached the end of history for corporate 
law by solving its remaining critical issues. Indeed, Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s unfortunate choice of title bears increasing resemblance to 
the ill-timed statement of the hapless official who, late in the nineteenth 
century, called for closing the patent office on the ground that everything 
worthwhile to invent already had been invented. 
The purpose of this Article is not to pick further, for the sake of doing 
so, at the bones of Hansmann and Kraakman’s or similar theses. Rather, 
this Article seeks to use the failure of such theses as a launching point 
for a broader consideration of the subject of convergence in corporate 
law. Essentially, this Article makes three interrelated claims regarding 
convergence in corporate law. 
Part I of this Article examines the history of convergence in corporate 
law. It develops the argument that the history of corporations and 
corporate law has been one of seemingly constant movement toward 
convergence. Yet contrary to the linear nature of the convergence theses 
typified by the “End of History” article, this seeming corporate law 
movement toward convergence never arrives at a final destination. From 
its beginning, corporate law was global law, and its history is marked by 
promiscuous transplants and copying between nations. Nevertheless, 
much like a school of fish, a flock of birds, a swarm of insects, or a herd 
of animals, corporate laws have not converged to a single point at which 
they stay at rest. Instead, corporate law convergence is incomplete and 
impermanent. 
Part II of this Article begins to develop a theory to explain why we 
observe the phenomenon discussed in Part II. Key to convergence 
predictions typified by the “End of History” article17 is the notion that 
forces of economic competition will drive corporations and corporate 
laws toward an equilibrium point marked by maximum efficiency—a 
sort of economic Darwinism. In response, various scholars have pointed 
out path dependencies and other forces that might maintain divergence 
despite such efficiencies. This Article will leave it to others to debate the 
relative strengths of the efficiency-based forces for convergence versus 
the forces for divergence. Instead, Part III’s thesis is that forces besides 
efficiency produce convergence. This means that convergence 
                                                     
17. See infra Part II. 
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commonly occurs around corporate laws and institutions that have no 
particular efficiency or other normative advantage, or that necessarily 
represent stable equilibrium points. 
Finally, Part III of this Article explores a question arising from Part 
I’s conclusion that the movement toward convergence remains perpetual 
because it is always incomplete and transitory. Specifically, Part III asks 
what are the important corporate laws and institutions by which to 
measure the extent of convergence at any one time. Implicit in the 
convergence literature lies the assumption that the authors are looking at 
the important issues and that the remaining areas of non-convergence are 
less worthy of concern. Part III, however, develops the thesis that 
convergence—or, more precisely, a stable convergence marking the 
“End of History”—is, in fact, least likely for the most important issues. 
This is because the most important issues—as measured, in a practical 
normative sense, by the difficulties they present to policymakers—are 
those in which tensions exist between competing policies and which lack 
easy solutions. Such policy tensions and lack of easy solutions make 
convergence amounting to anything more than a transitory phenomenon 
less likely. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE LAW 
While scholarship about convergence in corporate law is a relatively 
new phenomenon, convergence in corporate law itself is anything but. 
Indeed, as developed in detail below, corporate law’s history begins with 
global companies established by nations copying corporate forms and 
laws from each other, and convergence of corporate laws has been a 
continuous process throughout the history of corporate law with 
perpetual borrowing and transplants of corporate forms and laws 
between nations. 
A.  The Early Roots of Convergence 
Corporate law literally begins as global law because the inception of 
what we now refer to as the business corporation is found in European 
nations copying from each other in forming trading companies to engage 
in international commerce. What we in the United States call a 
“corporation” (or, more precisely, a business corporation) has been 
traditionally called a stock company or joint-stock company in other 
parts of the world.18 The label “corporation” comes from one attribute of 
                                                     
18. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 4 (2006). 
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this business form—treatment of the firm as a legal person (“body 
corporate”) able to own property and enter into and enforce contracts in 
its own right.19 The label “joint-stock company” comes from another 
aspect of this business form—ownership of the firm by investors of 
capital who receive transferable shares in the firm.20 Today’s 
corporations derive from the English and continental European joint-
stock companies formed late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth 
centuries to engage in trade with the Far East.21 
The Russia Company, formed in England in 1553 with the goal of 
finding a Northeast Passage to Asia, appears to have been the first 
English (and arguably the first altogether) joint-stock company.22 The 
English East India Company, formed in 1600, furnishes a more famous 
and influential example.23 These companies evolved out of an earlier 
form of merchant trading company, referred to by historians as 
“regulated companies.”24 Regulated companies received an exclusive 
franchise by the Crown to conduct trade in a particular foreign territory. 
The regulated companies, however, did not conduct operations as 
companies. Instead, the merchants, who were members of the company, 
conducted operations under the company’s franchise, either individually 
or in ad hoc partnerships.25 As trading voyages became longer, the 
resulting greater financial demands and risks led to a different approach: 
the members of the company subscribed to a common fund that financed 
the purchase of a combined or “joint” stock of goods for trading by 
                                                     
19. E.g., CONARD, supra note 3, at 136–38. 
20. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, 
SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 155–58 (1912) (discussing derivation of 
the term “stock”). 
21. E.g., Charles R. Hickson & John D. Turner, Corporation or Limited Liability Company, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD TRADE SINCE 1450 (John J. McCusker et al. eds., 2005) (modern 
corporation traces to the English Russia Company); Meir Kohn, Business Organization in Pre-
Industrial Europe 52 (Working Paper No. 03-09, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=427744 (noting that English and Dutch joint-
stock trading companies evolved into the modern industrial corporation).  
22. E.g., SCOTT, supra note 20, at 17. 
23. See, e.g., Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Cooperation-Enhancing 
Organization (Dec. 2005) (working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874406 (discussing the role of the English East 
India Company in advancing the development of enterprises in which strangers would invest).  
24. E.g., M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939) 
(tracing the joint-stock company to the regulated company in rebuttal to the claim that it was based 
upon Italian joint-fund arrangements). 
25. E.g., T.S. WILLAN, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RUSSIA COMPANY, 1553–1603, at 19–20 
(1956). 
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agents of the company.26 In the early days of the English East India 
Company, the joint stock lasted only for a given voyage; after which 
whatever money the voyage made would be distributed among the 
investors.27 Over time, the joint stock became a permanent fund for the 
continuing operations of the company.28 Investors who did not wish to 
wait until completion of the voyage, or indefinitely, for return of their 
money began to sell their shares in the joint stock—thus giving birth to 
stock markets.29 
Not only did these joint-stock trading companies operate globally, but 
their structures and organization also resulted from transnational 
borrowing, creating a sort of global corporate law or convergence from 
the very beginnings of the institution. Some historical evidence exists 
that the organizers of the Russia and English East India Companies, in 
adopting the joint-stock model, may have been influenced by earlier 
financing schemes of Italian banks and merchants, who had developed 
the use of pooled investments in common funds with investors holding 
transferable shares.30 Not long after the English East India Company 
came into existence, various Dutch merchants who traded in the East 
Indies came together to form the United (or Dutch) East India Company, 
following the joint-stock principle seen in the English company.31 The 
Dutch East India Company may have also been influenced by already 
existing Portuguese joint-stock companies trading in the East Indies.32 
The success of the English and Dutch East India Companies, in turn, 
spurred the formation by other European countries of joint-stock 
                                                     
26. E.g., Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of 
the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613, 622–23 (1983). 
27. E.g., SCOTT, supra note 20, at 92–101. 
28. E.g., 2 JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 119–
33 (1905). 
29. E.g., Harris, supra note 23, at 31–32. Because trading in shares in the English East India 
Company’s joint stock was somewhat restricted in its early years, the Dutch East India Company is 
able to claim credit for the first freely transferable shares trading in a stock market. Id.  
30. E.g., R. de Roover, The Organization of Trade, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
EUROPE 58–59 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1963). But see Schmitthoff, supra note 24 (challenging the 
claim of Italian influence); see also SCOTT, supra note 20, at 1–2, 13–14 (suggesting some, but not 
decisive, Italian influence).  
31. E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 24, at 93–96 (arguing that the Dutch were either influenced by 
the English or were following a parallel evolution).  
32. See, e.g., Murat Cizakca, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, The Islamic 
World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives, in 8 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
AND ITS HERITAGE 10, at 44–45 (Suraiya Faroqhi & Halil Inalcik eds., 1996). 
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companies for trade in the East Indies.33 
Having started in global trade, and with a pattern of international 
imitation (or convergence), use of the joint-stock company spread to 
other types of businesses34 and to other nations—the transplants resulted 
either from imitation (as in the Meiji Restoration in Japan)35 or from 
European colonization.36 From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, 
joint-stock companies—at least those arising from official sanction 
rather than creative contracting37—came into existence through charters 
granted individually by crown or legislature.38 In another great wave of 
international imitation (convergence), nations and sub-national 
governments developed general incorporation laws that allowed 
corporations (joint-stock companies) to come into existence without the 
need for a special legislative or royal charter. 
France, as a consequence of its revolution, seems to have pioneered 
this development—albeit with a retreat, until 1867, to a concession 
system requiring government approval for incorporation.39 New York 
followed the earlier French general-incorporation approach in 1811, 
                                                     
33. E.g., Schmitthoff supra note 24, at 93 (listing the formation of East India companies by 
France in 1604, Sweden in 1615, Denmark in 1616, and by a German principality (Brandenburg) in 
1651, as showing the Dutch East India Company’s influence on the development of the joint-stock 
company in continental Europe). For a discussion of the early Spanish resistance to copying the 
English and Dutch joint-stock trading companies, see Roland D. Hussey, Antecedents of the Spanish 
Monopolistic Overseas Trading Companies (1624–1728), 9 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1929). 
34. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 20, at 463–81 (listing English and Scottish joint-stock companies 
formed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in various fields). 
35. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
36. E.g., Phanor J. Eder, Company Law in Latin America, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 5–14 (1951) 
(discussing early Portuguese, Spanish, and colonial joint-stock companies in Latin America).  
37. In England, numerous unincorporated associations followed the joint-stock principle by 
issuing transferable shares in a common capital. These were organized as partnerships, or later as 
trusts, in which trustees held title to the firm’s property to be used for the benefit of the owners of 
transferable shares in the trust. These joint-stock associations often attempted to gain self-help 
limited liability for their shareholders by contracts with their creditors. See, e.g., Phillip I. 
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 582 (1986). Portuguese, 
Spanish, and early Latin American joint-stock companies also may not have needed a Royal charter 
to come into existence—as opposed to obtaining monopoly privileges. E.g., Eder, supra note 36, at 
15. Elsewhere in Europe, limited partnerships sometimes operated on the joint-stock principle. E.g., 
Mariana Pargendler, Politics in the Origins: The Making of Corporate Law in Nineteenth-Century 
Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming Summer 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1891915 (explaining that prior to 1867, limited partnerships with traded 
shares were far more prevalent than stock companies in France); JAMES M. BROPHY, CAPITALISM, 
POLITICS, AND RAILROADS IN PRUSSIA: 1830–1870, at 89–99 (1998) (discussing effort to form 
joint-stock banking companies in Prussia). 
38. E.g., Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law 14 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
39. Id. 
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from which laws gradually spread in the nineteenth century throughout 
the United States allowing anyone to incorporate through registration if 
the company met certain requirements.40 England, after facilitating 
contractually based joint-stock companies by repealing the Bubble Act 
in 1825, enacted company laws providing for incorporation by 
registration in 1844 (without limited liability for the shareholders) and 
1855 (with limited liability).41 In 1829, Spain introduced incorporation 
by registration; however, Spain, like France, retreated for a time in the 
mid-nineteenth century to a concession system.42 Germany’s stock-
company law based upon incorporation by registration followed the 
unification of the country in 1870 and 1871.43 
Not surprisingly, general-incorporation laws spread by imitation and 
transplant to the colonies and former colonies of European countries. For 
example, various Latin American countries, after achieving 
independence from Spain, eventually adopted company laws borrowing 
from Spanish or French laws.44 In some instances, this borrowing 
entailed copying directly from Spain or France; in other instances the 
borrowing was indirect as one country copied the company law from 
another country that had copied from Spain or France.45 This sometimes 
meant that the transplant, in fact, adopted approaches already abandoned 
in Spain or France.46 This also meant gradual movement toward 
incorporation upon registration in Latin America, with Chile, for 
example, requiring a government decree for incorporation until 1981.47 
                                                     
40. E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188–98 (2d ed. 1985).  
41. E.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 22 (3d ed. 1983); 
L.C.B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
1369, 1371 (1956). 
42. E.g., ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 
132–34 (1980). 
43. E.g., Carsten Burhop, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings in Imperial Germany, 
1870–1896, 2008/46 Preprints of the MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE 
GOODS 3–4, available at http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/10340/Burhoppaper.pdf (noting that free 
incorporation, which had previously only been available since 1861 in a few smaller German states, 
spread with the 1870 formation of the North-German federation, including Prussia, and then spread 
to the rest of Germany with the establishment of German Empire in 1871).   
44. E.g., Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 43–44. 
45. Id.; see also Pargendler, supra note 37, at 39–40 (discussing Brazil’s copying French and 
other nations’ corporate laws in a “cafeteria approach”). 
46. E.g., MEANS, supra note 42, at 152–64, 191–96 (discussing Colombia’s borrowing of Spain’s 
1829 free-incorporation law after Spain had retreated to a more restrictive concession system, and 
later borrowing Chile’s restrictive company law after European countries, like France and Spain, 
had liberalized their company laws to again allow free incorporation). 
47. E.g., Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 40–41, 43. 
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Japan provides an interesting example of a transplant in a nation that 
had not been subject to European colonization. Japan imported the joint-
stock company as part of the Meiji Restoration starting in 1870,48 and 
adopted Germany’s company law, including incorporation by 
registration, in 1898.49 
B. Continuous Borrowing and Transplants 
These global beginnings of corporate law are largely consistent with 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s depiction of an earlier convergence in 
corporate law, which adopted what they view to be the essential features 
of the corporation.50 The story of convergence and global corporate law, 
however, is not one of a hiatus after these initial steps, waiting for the 
wane of the twentieth century to complete the last step and reach the 
“End of History.” Rather, it is a story of continuous imitation and 
transplant among national and sub-national corporate laws creating 
constant convergence. 
1.  The General Patterns 
At this point, the reader might be puzzled at how constant 
convergence can exist, given that corporate law started as global law 
with substantial convergence, and that convergence, by its nature, 
seemingly implies an end point. The answer is that corporate laws are in 
a constant process of convergence and divergence as they move from 
one norm to another, and then to another or back again. 
A simple example illustrates the pattern: consider the global spread of 
prohibitions against corporate insiders trading based on inside 
information (“insider trading”), which occurred in the latter part of the 
last century.51 In the late 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, an 
increasing number of nations passed laws prohibiting insider trading.52 
                                                     
48. E.g., JOHANNES HIRSCHMEIER & TSUNEHIKO YUI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE 
BUSINESS: 1600–1973, at 82, 89, 112 (1975). 
49. E.g., K. Takayangi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law 1868–1961, 
in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 31–32 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren 
ed., 1963); see also Masao Fukushima, The Significance of the Enforcement of the Company Law 
Chapters of the Old Commercial Code in 1893, 24 L. IN JAPAN 171 (William Horton trans., 1991) 
(discussing the earlier 1893 Code). 
50. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 439–40. 
51. I confess that this example appealed to me on a personal level because this topic marked my 
first foray into comparative corporate law scholarship. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization 
of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63 (2002). 
52. E.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading 1 
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At first glance, this would appear to be a good illustration of 
convergence toward global law. Indeed, this development may be part of 
a broader convergence toward laws designed to promote dispersed 
shareholdings.53 Taking a longer view, however, the story is more 
complicated. Prior to the 1960s, no nation prohibited insider trading.54 
Thus, a convergence existed on the legality of insider trading prior to the 
1960s—it was not prohibited. The United States adopted the prohibition 
in 1962,55 followed by France in 1967, a few more nations in the 1970s, 
followed by increasing numbers of nations in the 1980s and 1990s, 
reaching the point today where the vast majority of nations with stock 
markets prohibit insider trading.56 Hence, what at first glance appears to 
be simply a story of convergence actually represents a gradual 
movement from one globally followed norm to another. Readers who 
carefully observe nature may find this phenomenon brings to mind the 
way in which a large flock of birds moves in stages from one perch to 
another. 
Many of the examples of imitation and transplants to new points of 
convergence in corporate law involve micro-issues focusing on specific 
rules and structures, like the prohibition of insider trading, the 
requirements for independent directors,57 or the mechanisms and 
standards for enforcing the duties of corporate directors.58 Other 
examples involve larger-scale concerns that implicate numerous rules 
and structures, such as the overall philosophy regarding the balance 
between regulation and deregulation. Some of the movements to new 
convergence points seem fairly unidirectional, at least within the time 
horizon of what we know, while others follow a cyclical pattern. 
                                                     
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
53. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk—Regulations Relating to Tender 
Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, 66 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1998); Eugenio Ruggiero, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy, 
22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 157, 160–61 (1996). 
54. E.g., Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 52, at 10.  
55. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act contained a provision (§ 16(b)) designed to remove 
incentives for insider trading by forcing certain categories of corporate insiders to give the 
corporation any money they made on certain purchases and sales of the corporation’s stock. The 
actual prohibition of insider trading, however, occurs in a 1962 Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) decision interpreting a rule it promulgated in 1942 (Rule 10b-5) pursuant to authority granted 
in the Securities Exchange Act to prohibit manipulative or deceptive acts. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 
48, at 70–71. 
56. See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 52, at 10. 
57. See infra notes126–130 and accompanying text. 
58. See infra notes 232–242 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Converging on Limited Liability 
The spread of limited liability for a corporation’s shareholders offers 
an example of a fairly unidirectional convergence. While today we tend 
to think of limited liability as an inherent part of corporate law, it was 
not the universal rule for much of corporate law’s history. Before 
general incorporation laws, the shareholders in individually chartered 
corporations (joint-stock companies) may have enjoyed limited liability, 
depending on the charter.59 England’s 1844 law allowing general 
incorporation did not provide limited liability for the shareholders of the 
companies formed under that act; this came after considerable debate in 
England’s 1855 act.60 Beginning in the nineteenth century, limited 
liability spread from state to state throughout the United States—from 
New York’s statute for double liability for manufacturing companies in 
1811, to New Hampshire and New Jersey in 1816, to Connecticut in 
1818, to Massachusetts in 1830, and finally to California in 1931—and 
expanded from partial (double liability) to full limited liability and from 
manufacturing corporations to banks (for which double liability only 
ended in the Great Depression).61 
Related to this convergence is the gradual spread of laws designed to 
make it easier for owners in closely held companies to enjoy limited 
liability. Probably the most notable example is Germany’s 1892 
invention of the limited liability company, which allowed owners of 
companies not issuing tradable stock to enjoy limited liability without 
meeting the requirements imposed on companies issuing such shares.62 
From Germany, the limited liability company spread throughout the civil 
law countries.63 Finally, in the 1990s, the limited liability company 
spread throughout the United States, in this instance as a means to enjoy 
limited liability without incurring tax disadvantages imposed on 
corporations.64 
3.  Regulations to Protect Non-shareholder Interests 
In contrast to the largely unidirectional convergence regarding limited 
                                                     
59. E.g., Blumberg, supra note 37, at 580. 
60. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41. 
61. E.g., Blumberg, supra note 37, at 593–601. 
62. E.g., Marcus Lutter, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in 13 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Ch. 2, at 2–6 (1998). 
63. Id. at 2–11. 
64. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 64 (4th ed. 2008). 
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liability, the overall balance in corporate laws between regulation and 
deregulation has followed a more cyclical and complex pattern of 
convergence. Discussing corporate regulation versus deregulation 
involves two fairly distinct concerns. First, a traditional concern of 
corporate law has been the protection of minority shareholders.65 A 
second concern involves the protection of persons and interests beyond 
the company’s shareholders. These persons and interests include a 
company’s creditors, employees, and customers, as well as the welfare 
of the broader community and the environment in which the corporation 
operates. 
As recent events illustrate, laws seeking to protect these non-
shareholders from the actions of corporations and their managers follow 
a fairly predictable cycle of regulation and deregulation, both in the 
United States and in the global community.66 These cycles, however, 
generally do not involve changes to corporate law. For example, cycles 
involving greater or lesser regulation over the lending practices of banks, 
the rights of workers to organize, the safety of products, and the limits 
on pollution generally do not address the subjects of corporate law. 
Corporate law addresses subjects such as selection of those in charge of 
the company, compensation of managers and owners of the corporation, 
liability of managers to the corporation and its owners, and other powers 
and duties of managers and owners.67 
Nevertheless, a long-standing debate in corporate law is the extent to 
which the rules governing the subjects it addresses (such as manager 
selection) should be designed with an eye toward the impact on 
constituents and interests beyond the shareholders and managers.68 This 
means that the movement in corporate law to protect such constituents 
and interests is not so much about regulation versus deregulation as it is 
about the locus of regulation—in other words, should corporate law seek 
to protect the interests of those dealing with corporations or should this 
be left to other laws? 
An example that illustrates this point involves the worry that 
                                                     
65. See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text. 
66. E.g., Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 
(1993) (“An almost inescapable feature of the economic and political cycle is the swing of the 
pendulum between regulation and deregulation.”); Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and 
Inadequate Regulation of Bankers: A Comment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29 (2010) 
(discussing cycles of regulation, business evasion, and new regulation). 
67. E.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214–15 (Del. 1987). 
68. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).  
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individual corporations might grow to obtain excessive economic power. 
Early general corporation laws in the United States contained various 
rules, such as a prohibition on forming holding companies, which 
limited the economic power of a single corporation.69 In an example of 
convergence famously labeled a “race to laxity” by Justice Brandeis,70 
corporate laws abandoned these restrictions.71 This abandonment, 
however, did not mark a unidirectional move toward deregulation 
because antitrust laws72 arose to address the concern about excessive 
economic power.73 Such laws have themselves seen their own cycles of 
regulation and deregulation.74 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s “End of History” thesis focuses largely 
on this question of using corporate laws to regulate the corporation in its 
dealings with non-shareholders.75 For example, Hansmann and 
Kraackman invoke the state of law regarding co-determination as an 
illustration of purported convergence.76 Co-determination, which 
German law pioneered,77 protects the interests of corporate employees 
by allowing them to elect some of the corporation’s directors. Some 
European nations,78 and more recently China, have imported this 
German invention.79 Still, in support of their claim that corporate laws 
are converging globally on a shareholder-oriented model, Hansmann and 
Kraakman note that there has been no widespread adoption of co-
                                                     
69. E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. 
VA. L. REV. 173, 194–95, 200–02 (1985). This was not true in France and Germany, which seemed 
to have lacked concern with powerful companies. E.g., Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 20. 
70. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The race 
was one not of diligence but of laxity.”). 
71. E.g., Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 249, 263–66 (1976). 
72. Known as “competition” laws in most parts of the world.  
73. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 266–67 
(1991) (explaining the abandonment of corporate law in favor of antitrust law to regulate corporate 
economic power). 
74. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 56–59 (3d ed. 2005). 
75. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16.  
76. Id. at 445–47. 
77. E.g., ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 308–11 (2010). 
78. E.g., Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance 
Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 89, 100 (2d ed. 2009) (listing 
Austria, Denmark, Luxemburg, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as allowing employees to elect 
one-third of the board). 
79. E.g., Jiong Deng, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in 
China, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 347, 353 (2005). 
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determination.80 
On the other hand, the current status of co-determination provides 
limited support for Hansmann and Kraakman’s theory of convergence 
away from a labor-oriented model. Far from representing a point of 
convergence, there seems to be little movement among nations to change 
to or from co-determination.81 Citations to academic works by critics of 
co-determination82—at the same time ignoring contrary scholarship83—
hardly shows that an intellectual, much less a policymaker, consensus 
has emerged rejecting the institution. Moreover, Hansmann and 
Kraakman ignore one source of growing employee power in the 
boardroom: the increasing ownership of stock by employee pension 
plans and the increasing willingness of unions and others operating these 
plans to utilize the power that comes with holding large blocks of voting 
shares.84 
It is not hard to find counterexamples to the thesis that nations are 
converging on the conclusion that the sole role of corporate law is to 
protect shareholders. Among such counterexamples are the passage in 
many states in the United States of so-called “other constituency 
statutes,” which allow directors to consider the interests of stakeholders 
other than the shareholders,85 and some provisions in the recent Dodd–
Frank financial regulation reform law that seem to use corporate 
governance reform as a tool to protect the public from the collapse of 
financial corporations.86 
                                                     
80. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 445. 
81. See Enriques et al., supra note 78. 
82. See generally Mark Roe, German Securities Markets and German Codetermination, 1998 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167 (1998). 
83. E.g., Elmar Gerum & Helmut Wagner, Economics of Labor Co-Determination in View of 
Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND 
EMERGING RESEARCH 341, 348–51 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
84. E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Activist Shareholders Are Imposing Political Agendas on Pension 
Funds, WASH. EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 2007, http://washingtonexaminer.com/node/436161 (“Union 
pension funds tried to remove directors or top managers, or otherwise affect corporate policy, at 
more than 200 corporations in 2004 alone.”).  
85. See generally A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for 
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990). 
86. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (dealing with executive pay 
at §§ 951–54, proxy access at § 971, and disclosures regarding chairperson and CEO structures at 
§ 972). For a discussion of how corporate governance provisions may limit excessive risk taking by 
financial corporations, see generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing 
a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 113 (2010).  
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4. Cycles of Regulation and Deregulation in Protecting Shareholders 
Largely absent from Hansmann and Kraakman’s “End of History” 
thesis is convergence on the appropriate balance between regulation and 
deregulation when it comes to shareholder protections. Hansmann and 
Kraakman identify the goal of protecting minority shareholders from 
expropriation by the majority and mention some currently favored 
approaches to protecting the minority. However, they do not address the 
balance between mandating protections for minority shareholders and 
allowing participants in corporations to make their own arrangements. 
This issue has continuously shifted between cycles of increased 
regulation and deregulation. 
These cycles trace back to the inception of laws allowing 
incorporation by registration, which marked a move toward deregulation 
by removing the requirement that corporations receive a special charter 
from the government.87 In nation after nation, the aftermath of such laws 
followed a depressingly similar pattern. A “founders’ boom” of forming 
numerous new companies often occurred after the enactment of these 
laws.88 When many of these new companies turned out to be ill-
conceived—or even fraudulent—and later failed, shareholders as well as 
creditors lost their money. This led to wider economic dislocations and a 
legislative response entailing greater regulation.89 Legislative responses 
to corporate busts have shifted over time and have included such fixes 
as: returning to the requirement for government approval to form a 
corporation;90 restricting small investors from making potentially 
improvident stock purchases;91 requiring companies to disclose 
                                                     
87. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 194 (“In theory, the special charter system was a 
strong mode of corporate control. But the demand for charters was too great.”).  
88. E.g., Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 13, 17, 43 (giving examples of founders’ booms in 
England, France, Germany and Spain); Pargendler, supra note 37, at 31 (discussing boom and bust 
in the decade following Brazil’s adoption of incorporation by registration in 1882). 
89. Id.; see also generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of 
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997) (discussing how busts produced increased regulation of 
securities in England and the United States); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the 
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 403–17 (2006) (giving a history 
of speculative stock bubbles and regulatory response from 1690 England through recent events in 
the United States). 
90. E.g. Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 13, 43. 
91. Id. at 31 (explaining that German enactment of minimum par value for stock in 1884 was to 
keep small investors from buying stock); William J. Ward, Comment, California Corporate 
Securities Law: Small Business Capital Formation and Investor Protection, 13 PAC. L. REV. 459, 
460 (1982) (discussing how the California administrative agency would apply the “fair, just and 
equitable” standard for approving the sale of securities to deny an open qualification allowing a sale 
to any buyer if the proposed business plan was speculative). 
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numerous facts to investors before selling them stock;92 and mandating 
various corporate governance rules designed to give shareholders the 
power to protect their interests from actions by corporate management.93 
While the legislative approaches have varied, the common denominator 
is mandatory protections that do not allow participants in the corporation 
to completely contract for their own arrangements.94 Invariably, fading 
memories and complaints about regulation push nations toward 
deregulation—renewed free incorporation,95 removal of restrictions on 
stock sales,96 reduction in the mandatory rules of corporate governance 
that protect minority shareholders97—only to be followed by booms, 
busts, and new restrictions.98 This cycle has continued all of the way to 
this century’s Sarbanes–Oxley99 and Dodd–Frank100 Acts in the United 
States, and similar laws in other countries.101  
                                                     
92. E.g., LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 2–3 (1983) (explaining that 
the English “Companies Act of 1844 enacted the first modern prospectus requirement” with 
“compulsory disclosure through the registration of prospectuses inviting subscriptions to corporate 
shares”; in the securities acts the United States Congress opted to follow the English compulsory 
disclosure model); Gerard Hertig, Reiner Kraakman & Edward Rock, Issuers and Investor 
Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH, supra note 78, at 275, 282–83 (discussing disclosure regimes in various countries).  
93. E.g., Enriques et al., supra note 78, at 55, 65, 69–71, 72–75 (discussing the strategy of giving 
shareholders decision rights as a means of protecting shareholder interests). 
94. See, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
62764, at 17 (In issuing the proxy access rules pursuant to the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC explained: 
“corporate governance is not merely a matter of private ordering. Rights, including shareholder 
rights, are artifacts of law, and in the realm of corporate governance some rights cannot be 
bargained away but rather are imposed by statute. There is nothing novel about mandated 
limitations on private ordering in corporate governance.”).  
95. E.g. Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 13–14, 43. 
96. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (preempting state securities laws 
regarding sale of “covered securities,” including securities listed on a national stock exchange after 
a public offering).  
97. E.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (arguing that state corporate laws in the United States “have watered the rights 
of shareholders vis-à-vis management down to a thin gruel”). 
98. E.g., Banner, supra note 89; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles 
of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 69 (2002) 
(“Between the 1960s and the 1980s, each of the major European countries copied the United States 
in creating a strong regulatory agency that was more or less modeled after the American SEC. Much 
of this legislation was, of course, crisis- and scandal-driven . . . .”). 
99. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes–Oxley) Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).  
100. See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
101. E.g., Michel Menjucq, Corporate Governance Issues in France, 7 STUD. INT’L FIN. ECON. & 
TECH. L. 101 (2004–2005) (inspired by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and recommendations of the 
European Commission on reforming the statutory audit, the French Government in August 2003 
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In some instances, these cycles did not represent movement or 
convergence in global norms, as some nations may have been in periods 
of greater regulation at the same time that others were in cycles of 
greater deregulation.102 In many cases, however, these cycles represented 
a moving global norm, as national and sub-national corporate laws 
converged around greater regulation or deregulation.103 Indeed, a 
common refrain in favor of deregulation from the early days of general 
incorporation laws was the assertion that corporations will form 
elsewhere—for example, England as opposed to France,104 or New 
Jersey and Delaware as opposed to New York105—if the more restrictive 
jurisdiction did not change its laws. At the other end of the cycle, the 
booms and busts that lead to a push for regulation may not be limited to 
one country.106 Moreover, global convergence on corporate regulation 
often involved more than just the prevailing philosophy. It also included 
imitation and transplant of either particular forms of increased regulation 
(as in the spread of laws requiring disclosure upon the sale of stock107) or 
of mechanisms allowing deregulation (as in the spread of the German 
invention of the limited liability company form with fewer mandatory 
requirements for corporations not issuing transferable stock108). 
In sum, whether the subject is the micro one of specific corporate 
laws and institutions, or the macro one of overall approach and 
philosophy, and whether the trend is unidirectional or cyclical, nations 
and sub-national jurisdictions are constantly copying each others’ 
                                                     
adopted the Financial Security Law); Katsumasa Suzuki, Japan Exercises U.S.-Style Control, 26 
INT’L FIN. L. REV. 61 (2007) (describing “J-Sox,” the Japanese version of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act); 
John Lyons, Mexico Moves to Tighten Laws over Securities: Unanimous Approval Comes Despite a 
Fierce Opponent; New Test for Regulators, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2005, at A14 (reporting that after 
enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the United States, Mexican officials began pushing for a 
similar law and in 2005, Mexico’s lower house of Congress approved sweeping changes to 
Mexico’s securities law); Circular, Sec. and Exch. Bd. of India (SEBI), Corporate Governance in 
Listed Companies–Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement (Oct. 29, 2004), 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcir0104.pdf (Indian version of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). 
102. E.g., Pistor et al., supra note 38, at 43–44 (giving example of Columbia changing its 
corporate laws in a manner that ran counter to trends elsewhere).  
103. Id. at 70–73 (discussing areas of both convergence and divergence in the evolution of 
corporate laws that protect investors in corporations and the parallel evolution of the development 
of free incorporation laws among nations). 
104. Id. at 13–14; Pargendler, supra note 37, at 28. 
105. E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Seligman, supra note 71. 
106. E.g., Coffee, supra note 98, at 69. 
107. See Enriques et al., supra note 78, at 100. 
108. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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corporate laws and institutions, with the result that such laws and 
institutions appear to be in perpetual movement toward convergence at a 
point that is continually shifting. Under these circumstances, claims that 
corporate law has reached the end of history are likely to be a mirage. 
This history, in turn, raises the question as to why corporate laws and 
institutions behave in this manner. 
II. WHY CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE LAW OCCURS 
A.  The Efficiency Hypothesis 
1. Economic Darwinism and Corporate Laws 
Biologists presumably have theories to explain convergence in the 
movement of flocks of birds, schools of fish, swarms of insects, or herds 
of animals. Why, however, do corporate (as well as many other) laws 
behave in a manner that creates a perpetual movement toward a never-
lasting convergence? Underlying the corporate law convergence thesis, 
as exemplified by the “End of History” article, is a very Western view of 
human history as linear tale of progress. Under this narrative, nations 
move to convergence on corporate law and institutions when, after a 
period of divergent experimentation, a consensus is reached which 
recognizes the best approach. 
The argument for this view of corporate law convergence lies in a sort 
of economic Darwinism. Corporations are in constant competition with 
each other and, in a global economy, this means competition with 
corporations from other countries. Corporations operating with less 
efficient corporate laws and structures will be at a disadvantage in this 
competition. At an extreme, this can mean the failure of firms operating 
under inefficient laws and institutions, and the survival of firms 
operating under an efficient system.109 
Of course, this stark scenario may assume far more significance for 
legal rules and institutions than they have in the real world. For example, 
in a world where different nations possess comparative advantages in 
different industries—the traditional rationale for world trade—firms 
organized under less efficient corporate laws and institutions can 
nevertheless survive when operating in an industry in which their 
country has a comparative advantage.110 Moreover, companies operating 
                                                     
109. E.g., Stilpon Nestor & John K. Thomson, Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD 
Economies: Is Convergence Under Way?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 19, 35 (2001).  
110. E.g., Clarke, supra note 7, at 100. 
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under less efficient corporate laws and institutions might actually grow 
more than their rivals if these corporate laws and institutions allow or 
even encourage managers to sacrifice profit maximization for corporate 
empire building.111 
Hence, proponents of the efficiency-driven convergence thesis often 
make more subtle claims. Instead of positing that corporations in nations 
with less efficient corporate laws and institutions will go bankrupt before 
the onslaught of companies from nations with more efficient laws and 
institutions, the common argument is that capital will gravitate toward 
companies organized under more efficient laws and institutions.112 This 
means that more new, or more vibrant and growing, companies will be 
formed under efficient laws and institutions, gradually replacing or 
rendering less relevant the aging or smaller companies that were formed 
under less efficient laws and institutions.113 Also, the greater tax base 
provided by companies formed under more efficient laws and 
institutions will lead governments to change less efficient laws and 
institutions.114 Along similar lines, the greater interests of those who 
profit more from corporations operating under efficient laws and 
institutions will eventually place more pressure on governments to adopt 
such laws and institutions than the pressure governments feel from those 
groups who profit, but less in the aggregate, from inefficient laws and 
institutions.115 
2. Forces for Divergence 
Critics have challenged various links in the efficiency-driven 
convergence thesis, even in its more subtle variations. For example, they 
have questioned the empirical support for the proposition that 
corporations must operate under the most efficient rules and institutions 
in order to attract investment in globalized financial markets.116 They 
have also argued that political forces are as likely, if not more likely, to 
preserve divergence as they are to promote convergence in corporate 
laws.117 
The leading work dealing with the impact of political forces on 
                                                     
111. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 461–62. 
112. E.g., Nestor & Thomson, supra note 109, at 34.  
113. E.g., Gugler et al., supra note 2, at 151–52; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 451. 
114. E.g., Gugler et al., supra note 2, at 151–52; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 451. 
115. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 463. 
116. E.g., Clarke, supra note 7, at 98–99. 
117. E.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 2, at 157–61. 
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convergence of corporate laws comes from Mark Roe (sometimes joined 
with others).118 Roe argues that the persistence of different national 
patterns of dispersed versus concentrated shareholdings reflects path 
dependence.119 Specifically, the historic hostility toward large banks in 
the United States made banks and large financial institutions in the 
United States unable or reluctant to take potentially controlling interests 
in corporations, with the result that large corporations in the United 
States ended up with dispersed shareholders.120 By contrast, other 
countries with less political aversion to large banks ended up with 
corporate control by holders of large blocks of voting shares.121 Once 
they started down their respective routes, nations then adopted laws, 
institutions, and practices that supported and made it difficult to change 
the norm of either dispersed or concentrated shareholders.122 
Of course, this discussion of convergence to a single most efficient set 
of corporate laws and institutions assumes that there is one set that has 
greater efficiency than other sets—or at least sufficiently greater to 
actually matter. This may not be true to the extent that there are tradeoffs 
between various laws and institutions and the results they might 
promote—i.e., dispersed versus concentrated shareholdings—which 
leaves the advantages more or less evenly balanced.123 
In any event, existing scholarship has given due attention to the 
question of whether path dependence and other possible barriers to 
convergence will block the forces pushing convergence toward 
efficiency. A question that has received little attention is whether there 
are other forces that push convergence toward inefficient or less 
normatively desirable outcomes. 
B.  Inefficient Convergence 
1.  Fads and Fashions 
It used to be said in jest about male law professors that you could tell 
when they left the practice of law to enter teaching by the width of the 
neckties they wore—because they stopped buying new ties upon leaving 
                                                     
118. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
119. See id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 2. 
123. E.g., Mary O’Sullivan, The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance, 10 
REV. INT’L. POL. ECON. 23, 27 (2003). 
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practice and the width of ties constantly changes. If one thinks about this 
saying, the interesting question is not what it says about male law 
professors, but rather what it says about male lawyers (or males in many 
other professions): why do (or did) so many men buy new ties and stop 
wearing their older ties as the fashionable width changes? Indeed, why 
does anyone wear as non-functional an item of clothing as a necktie? 
The answer, of course, is that the forces for convergence in human 
behavior are not necessarily based upon efficiency. 
Returning to the discussion of corporate laws and institutions, there 
are at least three reasons why such laws and institutions may converge at 
points that fail to have any particular efficiency or other normative 
advantage. The first of these reasons, in fact, is the one illustrated by 
clothing—this being the tendency in human behavior to follow fads and 
fashions for their own sake. A body of comparative law scholarship 
studies the precise motivations and mechanisms causing migration of 
legal rules between nations, looking for such influences as overseas 
studies by persons pushing law reform, communication between legal 
elites from different nations, or the persuasiveness of “other nations do 
this” arguments.124 Later portions of this Article will consider two more 
specific motivations for importation of corporate laws—the endogenous 
variables problem that confuses correlation and causation, and rent-
seeking by those favored by another nation’s law. For now, however, it 
is not necessary to consider the precise mechanisms causing one nation 
to imitate corporate laws simply because other nations have adopted 
those laws—just as it is not necessary to understand the precise 
mechanisms and motives for the influence of clothing fashions in order 
to appreciate that people follow clothing fashions for the sake of being in 
fashion. Rather, it is simply necessary to recognize the existence of this 
phenomenon. 
The global spread of the prohibition on insider trading, discussed 
earlier,125 may be a phenomenon best explained in terms of fads and 
fashions. Curiously, this prohibition spread around the world at the same 
time that academic commentary in the nation of its origin, the United 
States, increasingly questioned the utility of the prohibition.126 The claim 
                                                     
124. E.g., John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step toward Erosion of 
National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89, 131–34 (2006); Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: 
A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
119, 130–45 (2007); Katerina Lino, Diffusion Through Democracy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 678 (2011). 
125. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
126. See generally Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Michael Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1980); H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & 
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that the prohibition encourages investment by small shareholders, 
dispersed shareholdings, and a lower cost of capital—its efficiency 
justifications—rests either upon faith, or upon extremely subtle and only 
later-produced evidence.127 Therefore, it would not seem to explain why 
the doctrine spread in the late 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the prohibition 
seems to have spread based upon the issue catching the public 
imagination128—particularly insofar as the acceleration in the 
prohibition’s worldwide spread followed high profile insider trading 
prosecutions in the United States129 and, in the case of Japan, a high 
profile insider trading scandal.130 
More recently, the worldwide spread of requirements for boards to 
contain so-called independent directors has outstripped the mixed 
evidence supporting the utility of the institution—suggesting again fad 
or fashion is at work. Interestingly, the notion of independent directors 
harkens back to the German invention of the two-tier board in which a 
supervisory board of directors, who are forbidden to be executives of the 
company, monitor a board of senior executives who actually run the 
company.131 From there it is but a short jump to Melvin Eisenberg’s 
influential notion of the monitoring board—specifically, the idea that 
boards cannot run or make broad policy for the large firm, but rather can 
only serve a useful function by monitoring the senior executives who 
actually make policy and run the firm.132 Moreover, such monitoring 
must be done by directors who are not the executives being monitored. 
The idea of independent directors expands upon the notion that the 
monitoring directors should not be executives, by adding that monitoring 
                                                     
ECON. 149 (1992) (noting that profitable trading by insiders in the United States suggests that 
trading of material non-public information by insiders continues despite the prohibition on insider 
trading).  
127. See generally Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 52 (discussing a study in 2000 that found 
that passage of insider trading prohibitions in various nations did not lower the cost of capital, but 
the first enforcement action did have this effect).  
128. Gevurtz, supra note 51, at 67 (“[T]he spread of insider trading prohibitions might reflect 
nothing more rational than the securities law mirror of the spread of American rock-and-roll, Levi’s 
Jeans, and McDonald’s hamburgers.”). 
129. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (involving leaking the contents 
of the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column); In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 36 
F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving the highly publicized insider trading by arbitrageur, Ivan 
Boesky). 
130. E.g., Tomoko Akashi, Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1296, 1302–03 (1989). 
131. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act] Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, “as 
amended,” §§ 105(1), 111(1). 
132. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 149–85 (1976). 
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directors should also not have dealings that would subject them to 
influence by the corporation’s executives.133 
One problem, however, is that gains achieved by independent 
directors in terms of objectivity may be offset by the loss of firm specific 
expertise among the directors—as the board contains fewer people with 
inside knowledge of the company.134 Whether it is for this reason or the 
hopelessness of the whole institution of the corporate board, various 
efforts to study the impact of independent directors have failed to 
demonstrate unequivocally improved performance.135 Still, this has not 
stopped nations from jumping on the bandwagon.136 For example, China 
adopted an independent directors requirement even though there was no 
evidence of improved performance in Chinese companies already having 
independent directors.137 Moreover, China took this action despite the 
fact that it had already adopted the German supervisory board model and 
therefore already had non-executive directors monitoring the 
performance of executives. To top it off, in a milestone of the 
redundancy that can occur when a nation simply copies institutions from 
other nations, China left in place the requirement for supervisory 
directors.138 
An examination of the history of corporate law transplants could 
endlessly multiply the examples of imitations reflecting fads and 
                                                     
133. See, e.g., Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–l (2006) (amended Section 10A of the 
Securities Exchange Act to mandate that independent directors, which the statute defines, serve on 
registered corporations’ audit committees). 
134. E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing 
Standards, at text accompanying nn.58–65 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
02-15, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=317121. 
135. E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 922 (1999); E. Han Kim & Yao Lu, 
Unintended Consequences of the Independent Board Requirement on Executive Suites (March 8, 
2011) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781462. Studies in less developed 
economies suggest perhaps a greater impact.  J. Mark Mobius, Issues in Global Corporate 
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 39, 47–48 (Low Chee 
Keong ed., 2002) (noting that studies in emerging markets show better stock performance of 
companies with so-called better corporate governance, including more independent boards). 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how much of this result comes from having independent directors 
versus from other so-called good corporate governance practices. It is also hard to see how much of 
improved market returns reflect a current desire by investors for stock of companies with so-called 
better corporate governance practices, and how much reflects actual improved performance by such 
corporations. 
136. E.g., Enriques et al., supra note 78, at 64–65 (discussing the spread of hard and soft law 
requirements for independent directors). 
137. E.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006); Deng, supra note 79, at 352–53. 
138. Id. 
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fashions as opposed to any particular efficiency advantage. Amusingly, 
in an earlier era of slower change, the reflexive copying of corporate 
laws from one nation to another might have been sufficiently gradual 
that later imitators only arrived at the initial approaches well after the 
nations at the beginning of the chain had already abandoned them.139 
2.  The Endogenous Variables Problem 
A second explanation for convergence around corporate laws and 
institutions that lack any particular efficiency or other normative 
advantage lies in the endogenous variables problem. In less 
mathematical language, it is human nature to draw confused conclusions 
regarding causation when policy makers deal with bundled rules and 
institutions. Specifically, when looking at an apparently successful 
model—whether this is an individual company or the overall economy 
of a nation—policymakers face a difficult challenge in determining 
which of the many features of this model (such as laws) are responsible 
for its apparent success. Under these circumstances it is tempting to copy 
features that may have had little influence in the model’s success. 
The literature surrounding the relationship between corporate laws 
and dispersed shareholders provides a recent example of this 
endogenous variables problem. A series of studies by financial 
economists La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV)140 
began by noting the worldwide split, discussed earlier, in the 
shareholding patterns for the largest corporations between the dispersed 
pattern found in the United States and England, and the more 
concentrated ownership found in most other countries. LLSV then 
sought to determine the causes for this divide. They did this by looking 
for statistical correlations between various laws and legal institutions 
and the pattern of shareholdings.141 So, for example, LLSV found a 
patent correlation between common law countries (England and the 
United States) and dispersed shareholders, as opposed to civil law 
countries (Continental Europe, Latin America, most of Asia) and 
                                                     
139. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
140. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). 
141. See sources cited supra note 140. 
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concentrated shareholdings.142 Focusing more specifically on corporate 
laws, LLSV speculated that laws protecting minority shareholders 
should logically lead to greater dispersion of shares, and, sure enough, 
found a correlation between jurisdictions whose corporate laws followed 
LLSV’s list of minority shareholder protections and greater dispersion of 
shareholdings.143 
Policy prescriptions resulting from LLSV’s work regarding minority 
shareholder protections soon followed. If, as appeared to be the case in 
the 1990s when this work was published, dispersed shareholders 
produced better corporate and overall economic performance, and if, as 
seemingly demonstrated by the correlation studies, minority shareholder 
protections led to dispersed shareholdings, then nations should adopt 
minority shareholder protections. This certainly seemed persuasive to 
the World Bank, as it advised developing nations on the rules they 
should adopt.144 
Other scholars have pointed out serious holes in LLSV’s work about 
minority shareholder protections. To begin with, there is a rather 
fundamental timing flaw in LLSV’s effort to draw a causal link from a 
static correlation study. Specifically, the dispersal of shareholdings in 
the United States and England predated adoption of many of the 
minority shareholder protections LLSV depended upon in drawing a 
correlation between minority shareholder protections and dispersed 
shareholdings.145 The implication of this history is that rather than 
minority shareholder protections leading to dispersed shareholdings, 
dispersed shareholdings created a demand for minority shareholder 
protections.146 
Moreover, LLSV’s list of minority shareholder protections contains 
numerous laws of questionable significance. For example, they list 
cumulative voting among the minority shareholder protections found in 
the United States.147 Cumulative voting, however, is not the prevailing 
                                                     
142. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 140. 
143. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 140. 
144. E.g., Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business 
Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 771–72 (2009). 
145. E.g., Cheffins, supra note 5, at 30–31. 
146. See generally Coffee, supra note 98. 
147. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 140, at 1127. Cumulative voting allows a 
shareholder to place all of the shareholder’s votes, as represented by the number of the 
shareholder’s voting shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected, on less than the 
number of directors to be elected. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 503–04 (2d ed. 
2010). 
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rule in the United States148 and, in any event, only aids shareholders 
controlling substantial blocks of stock—meaning that it lacks much 
impact in corporations with dispersed shareholdings.149 This illustrates 
that nations adopting LLSV’s minority shareholder protection laws in 
order to encourage dispersed shareholdings will end up adopting a 
number of laws that achieve little in this regard—even though such laws 
may appear to correlate with the sought after goal.150 
It is nothing new for nations to adopt pointless or inefficient corporate 
laws and institutions because they are part of a package that correlates 
with seemingly better corporate or economic performance. Consider the 
worldwide adoption of the norm that a board of directors, normally 
elected by the shareholders, has the ultimate authority over management 
of the corporation. Of course, delegated management would appear to be 
a practical necessity in a firm with widely dispersed and constantly 
trading ownership shares. Still, it is less clear why ultimate authority 
should reside in an elected board operating as peers as opposed to an 
elected or even unelected chief executive officer, manager, or 
managers—as is common in unincorporated firms such as limited 
partnerships151 and also corresponds to reality in publicly held 
corporations.152 
In fact, the corporate board of directors seems to be a fairly 
dysfunctional institution in search of a purpose for its existence. Various 
studies in the United States,153 Japan,154 France,155 and Germany156 
                                                     
148. GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 505. 
149. Id. at 503, 506. But see Jeffrey Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at 
Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124 (1994) (arguing that cumulative voting may be useful 
in public corporations as a mechanism to allow institutional investors to obtain representation on the 
board). 
150. For further discussion, see Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La 
Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights Index” Under Consistent Coding (Harvard Law Sch. John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus. Fellows Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf.  
151. E.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT, prefatory note (2001) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act is to provide a form of business for people who want strong central management, 
strongly entrenched, and passive investors with little control). 
152. See infra notes 154–158 and accompanying text. 
153. E.g., ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143 
(1966) (the board of directors in the typical large corporation does not actively exercise an 
important part in the leadership function); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTHS AND REALITY 107 
(1971) (study finding that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance but instead 
often served as little more than “attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree”); ROBERT 
A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 209 (2d ed. 2001) (“The primary 
conclusion of this chapter is that America’s boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to 
protect shareholders’ interests.”); Rita Komik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in 
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document how corporate boards are commonly passive pawns of 
management and have no real role in running the corporation or 
disciplining those who do. Claims of improvement in the institution in 
recent years have proven ephemeral.157 The history of the institution 
documents that this state of affairs is nothing new.158 
So why then did the corporate board of directors develop as the 
governing institution for corporations, and why did this model of 
governance spread from nation to nation and become the worldwide 
norm? The answer to the first question is historical accident. Elected 
boards (along with a governor) constituted the governing institution for 
the regulated companies from which the early joint-stock companies 
derived.159 This mode of governance reflected medieval European 
political theories under which decisions impacting a society—be it a 
kingdom, a town, or a merchant guild—required the members’ consent, 
either directly or through elected representatives.160 These theories fit 
                                                     
Corporate Governance, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 166–67 (1987) (modern board is a “co-opted 
appendage institution”); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality—Ten Years Later, 32 RUT. L. 
REV. 293, 297 (1979) (study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director passivity). 
154. E.g., OXFORD ANALYTICA LTD., BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
TRENDS IN G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1992), reprinted in MONKS & MINOW, 
supra note 153, at 267 (stating that in Japan formal authority is held by the company president and 
the board of directors, but board meetings are infrequent and decisions are rubber stamped; real 
authority is held by the president and the operating committee composed of the president’s 
immediate subordinates). 
155. Id. at 292. The president director-general (PDG) of French companies wields almost 
unchecked control over the enterprise without the counter power of the board, whose composition 
and agenda the PDG controls; indeed, it is regarded as bad manners for the board to vote on a 
management decision. Id. 
156. E.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 539, 568 (2000) (German corporate supervisory boards meet infrequently and their 
information has been weak). 
157. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241–42 (2002) (Enron’s 
board was “a splendid board on paper” and its failure “reveal[s] a certain weakness with the board 
as a governance mechanism”); The Way We Govern Now—Corporate Boards, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1533377 (discussing poor board governance in light of 
corporate scandals involving Enron); Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, What’s a Director To Do? 
(Harvard Negotiation, Org. and Mkts. Research, Paper No. 02-38, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=357722 (“The recent wave of corporate scandals provides 
continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the top-level corporate control 
mechanism.”). 
158. E.g., William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Political and Historical Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004). 
159. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 158, at 115–22. 
160. Id. at 129; SUSAN REYNOLDS, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 900–
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naturally into regulated companies in which the members conducted 
their own trading and the role of the elected board was largely to make 
rules for the members.161 When the regulated company evolved into the 
joint-stock company, the board governance model continued without 
anyone asking whether an institution providing consent in making rules 
for a merchant society was also the best way to run a business in which 
the voting members were now passive investors.162 
As non-European nations adopted the joint-stock company 
(corporate) form of business, they simply copied all the features of the 
institution, including the board, without asking what was really 
necessary or useful. The Japanese experience is highly illustrative. 
Central to the Meiji Restoration was the importation of Western 
institutions that the Japanese believed would develop their country.163 
This included the joint-stock company, which the Japanese saw as the 
organization building railroads and industries in the United States, 
England, and Europe.164 Because the Japanese observed that joint-stock 
companies (or corporations) in the United States, England, and 
elsewhere were apparently run by boards of directors, they abandoned, at 
least formally, their traditional modes of business governance in favor of 
board governance.165 One irony is that in the earliest Japanese joint-stock 
companies, the Japanese seem to have been unclear what the directors 
were supposed to do.166 Not surprisingly, the directors eventually figured 
out that their job was to let the officers run the company and not do 
much of anything.167 This in turn led to the ultimate irony in endogenous 
reasoning: Japanese observers criticized their directors for such passivity 
in writings that assumed directors in the United States and England were 
behaving differently168—at the same time directors in the United States 
                                                     
1300, at 302–05 (2d ed. 1997); ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 25, at 52–53 (1984). 
161. E.g., WILLAN, supra note 25, at 19–20; Gevurtz, supra note 158, at 120. 
162. E.g., WILLAN, supra note 25, at 19–21; Gevurtz, supra note 158, at 122. 
163. See generally RODNEY CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 30 (1979). 
164. See HIRSCHMEIER & YUI, supra note 48. 
165. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 937–40 (2004); Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of the 
Organizational Structure of Top Management in Meiji Japan, in 1 JAPANESE YEARBOOK ON 
BUSINESS HISTORY 1, 4–5 (1984).  
166. CLARK, supra note 163, at 18–19. 
167. E.g., HIRSCHMEIER & YUI, supra note 48, at 7 (quoting Ukichi Taguchi, the publisher of the 
Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, then Japan’s most influential economic journal, who wrote in 1884, “directors 
[of Japanese banks] might as well be retired . . .  the president handles everything himself”). 
168. Id. 
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and England were passively watching management of railroads and 
other companies defraud the shareholders.169 
3. Rent-Seeking 
A third reason for convergence around corporate laws and institutions 
that lack any particular efficiency or other normative advantage is 
interest group rent-seeking. Hansmann and Kraakman recognized this 
force for inefficient convergence in their “End of History” article.170 As 
one example, they point to convergence around limited liability for 
corporate shareholders.171 It is not surprising that Hansmann and 
Kraakman should point to limited liability as an inefficient convergence, 
because some years earlier they had achieved considerable scholarly 
notoriety for an article advocating significant curtailment of the 
doctrine.172 
In fact, a controversial article by Hansmann and Kraakman is not the 
only thing that can cause one to question the efficiency of the 
convergence favoring limited liability. The excessive risk taking by 
financial corporations culminating in the 2008 financial crisis illustrates 
once again the moral hazard created by limited liability.173 A common 
justification for allowing this moral hazard is the critical role that limited 
liability plays in facilitating dispersal of shareholdings and development 
of stock markets.174 However, historical evidence from nineteenth 
century England—in which different approaches to limited liability 
allow for empirical observation of the extent to which dispersed 
shareholdings and stock markets arise with or without limited liability—
raises strong questions as to the accuracy of this rationalization.175 
                                                     
169. For a contemporary literary account of board passivity in the face of the railroad frauds in 
the late 1800s, see ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE NOW 298–309 (1875) (“Melmotte [the 
chief executive officer of the company and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion] would speak a 
few slow words . . . always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agree to everything, 
somebody would sign something, and the ‘Board’ . . . would be over.”). 
170. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 466–67. 
171. Id. 
172. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879 (1991). 
173. E.g., Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why 
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173 (2010). 
174. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94–96 (1985); Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An 
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 136–38 
(1980). 
175. See generally Graeme G. Acheson, Charles R. Hickson & John D. Turner, Does Limited 
Liability Matter? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century British Banking, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 247 
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Closer to home and time, the fact that California’s economy was able to 
function without limited liability for corporate shareholders until 1931 
would seem to say something.176 
Moreover, the rationale for shareholders in public corporations to 
enjoy limited liability hardly explains the extent and direction of the 
convergence in favor of the doctrine. As mentioned above,177 the 1892 
German invention of the limited liability company—which is expressly 
designed to make it easier to have limited liability for controlling owners 
in closely held firms—spread like wildfire in the 1990s throughout the 
United States, despite the fact that in closely held firms the moral hazard 
created by limited liability is high and the utility of this doctrine is 
low.178 If this was not enough limited liability for controlling owners of 
businesses, the limited liability partnership—creating limited liability for 
ordinary partners by the magic of merely filing a piece of paper—also 
spread throughout the United States in the 1990s.179 
Hansmann and Kraakman theorize that this spread of limited liability 
resulted from the fact that shareholders (whom the doctrine favors) are 
more organized in pursuing their interests than prospective unpaid 
creditors of corporations (whom the doctrine disfavors)—especially 
unpaid creditors like future tort victims, who do not even realize their 
interest in the issue until later.180 Of course, one might suspect that a 
similar interest group dynamic could be at work in the periodic 
convergence toward deregulation that removes mandatory protections 
for minority shareholders. Corporate managers who face limits on their 
power and potential liability at the behest of minority shareholders 
presumably favor such deregulation.181 And indeed, throughout the 
history of corporate laws, corporate managers have used the threat of 
incorporating in another jurisdiction to encourage removal of restrictive 
corporate laws.182 
                                                     
(2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol6/iss2/art6. 
176. Blumberg, supra note 37, at 597–99. 
177. See supra text accompanying note 62–64. 
178. E.g., Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 174, at 109–10; Halpern et al., supra note 174, at 
140–41. 
179. E.g., Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth 
(Nearly), 66 COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1065–66 (1995).  
180. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 466–67. 
181. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1468 (1992) (explaining why 
managers may prefer state laws that insulate them from threat of removal and allow self dealing 
despite such laws’ lowering the value of corporate stock).  
182. See supra text accompanying notes 104–105. 
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Deregulation with respect to shareholder protection, however, does 
not produce a permanent convergence because busts produce a backlash 
by disgruntled shareholders.183 By contrast, the boom and bust cycle 
seems to have had a ratcheting effect that favors limited liability. During 
booms, corporate creditors presumably are less concerned with limited 
liability. It has been during busts, however, that many extensions of 
limited liability have occurred—such as California’s change in 1931,184 
the creation of limited liability partnerships in the United States to 
protect professional firms being sued for malpractice following the 
savings and loan crisis in the early 1990s,185 as well as earlier examples 
in England186 and elsewhere. Such busts make the issue of limited 
liability even more salient to shareholders, who then recognize the 
danger from unlimited liability and are able to catch more sympathy than 
creditors. 187 
In sum, the debate over whether Darwinian evolution will force 
convergence of corporate law into efficient forms or be stymied by path 
dependence or other barriers overlooks much (if not most) of the action 
when it comes to corporate law convergence. Between mindless 
following of fads and fashions in corporate law, erroneous assumptions 
that corporate forms or rules correlating with successful performance 
produced that performance, and opportunistic rent-seeking by groups 
pushing for importation of forms and rules that favor their interests, 
much of corporate law convergence has little to do with efficiency. 
III. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IN MEASURING CONVERGENCE 
A.  The Assumptions of Academics 
Even the most diehard believer in the convergence of corporate laws 
and institutions expects that some residual differences will remain 
between the corporate laws and institutions of various nations.188 At the 
same time, even the greatest skeptic of convergence recognizes the 
existing similarities among the corporate laws and institutions of various 
                                                     
183. See supra text accompanying notes 89–101. 
184. E.g., Blumberg, supra note 37, at 599. 
185. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 179, at 1065–66. 
186. E.g., Blumberg, supra note 37, at 584. 
187. For a history of corporate law in one country (Brazil), which shows how elites selected 
corporate laws from other nations in order to advance their interests, see Pargendler, supra note 37.  
188. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 464–65. 
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countries.189 Hence, any discussion of convergence must embody some 
value judgments by which to decide the relative significance of the areas 
of similarity versus the areas of difference. 
If we accept the Darwinian evolution toward efficiency model, we 
might reach the rather circular conclusion that convergence itself proves 
the importance of the corporate law or institution upon which nations 
have converged—less important issues being ones where inefficient 
divergence can survive.190 The prior part of this article, however, gives 
us reasons to pause before assuming that efficiency, rather than other 
forces, drives convergence. If we cannot rely on convergence itself, how 
else can we assess the importance of areas of convergence versus 
divergence? 
Unfortunately, too much of the literature on convergence seems to 
rely on the authors’ personal interest in a rule or institution or on the 
presence of academic literature addressing the particular rule or 
institution, rather than carefully examining the importance of the 
corporate rule or institution in the practical workings of corporate law. 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s “End of the History” article provides a good 
illustration. It speaks of adoption of the “standard shareholder-oriented 
model” as marking the point of convergence on the ostensibly remaining 
critical issues facing corporate law—these being, according to 
Hansmann and Kraakman, the accommodation of non-shareholder 
interests as well as the protection of minority shareholders from 
expropriation by the majority.191 This standard shareholder-oriented 
model encompasses a mélange of notions, some of which consist of the 
components of the model and others which consist of contrasts drawn 
with other models. This model, however, is largely irrelevant to 
corporate law, is relatively unimportant in the practical workings of 
corporate law, or fails to display the convergence that Hansmann and 
Kraakman proclaim. 
The other models against which Hansmann and Kraakman contrast 
the standard shareholder-oriented model are the manager, labor, and 
state-oriented models. The state-oriented model, as Hansmann and 
Kraakman largely concede, has little to do with corporate law—at least 
since general incorporation laws replaced individually granted corporate 
charters bestowed upon those who asserted some public advantage from 
                                                     
189. E.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 2, at 236–37. 
190. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 465–66 (referring to corporate law 
differences that do not impact efficiency and therefore are less likely to converge as “harmless 
mutations”). 
191. Id. at 440. 
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the proposed enterprise. State ownership of corporate enterprises, which 
existed in many parts of the world throughout the twentieth century, 
constitutes the most dramatic example of a state-oriented model. Since 
the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” however, the prevailing consensus has 
generally disfavored state ownership of corporations192—albeit, state 
ownership, at least of many large banks, came close to making a 
comeback in 2008.193 This, however, is an issue about economic 
structure on the most macro level, rather than the subject of corporate 
law.194 About the best Hansmann and Kraakman can do is speculate that 
states might use their role in enforcing corporate laws to further a 
government industrial policy. Such actions, however, seem to be pretty 
small potatoes in the arsenal available to a government determined to 
implement such a policy, and there is no sign of a convergence that 
would make enforcement of corporate laws an entirely private affair.195 
The labor-oriented model, which was pioneered in Germany, involves 
the ability of employees to elect some members of the board of directors 
(co-determination). Regardless of whether co-determination is all that 
significant in the practical workings of corporate law, Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s thesis runs into a problem in claiming that there is 
convergence on rejecting this institution. Rather, as discussed above,196 
there does not seem to be much movement either way by nations on this 
question. 
The manager-oriented model gets us into the heart of corporate law 
by addressing the balancing of discretion given to (versus checks 
imposed on) those in charge of the corporation. Hansmann and 
Kraakman, however, sidetrack this into a largely abstract academic 
debate. Specifically, they focus on the public interest rationale for 
granting managers substantial discretion in running the corporation. This 
                                                     
192. See, e.g., William Megginson, Privatization, Foreign Policy, No. 118, at 14–27 (2000) 
(describing the growing privatization of government owned enterprises in the 1990s and thereafter). 
193. See generally Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business 
and the Law, 5 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 561 (2010). 
194. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 522, 2006 (F.R.G.) (criminal prosecution in Germany for 
breach of duty in granting executive bonuses); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, ALAN R. PALMITER & FRANK 
PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY. MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 157–58 (5th ed. Supp. 
2006) (criminal prosecution of Tyco’s ex-CEO in the “$5000 shower curtains” case for taking 
excessive perks); Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and 
International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 63 (2011) (noting that in many nations, the capital 
market’s regulatory authority enforces corporate governance rules). 
196. Far from representing a point of convergence, there seems to be little movement among 
nations to change to or from co-determination. 
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rationale supports giving managers substantial discretion based upon the 
argument that managers will use their discretion to run the corporation in 
a way that advances the interest of the general public197 or the interests 
of all the stakeholders in the corporation, including employees, creditors, 
customers, and the like.198 Hansmann and Kraakman come down on the 
side of what is generally labeled “shareholder primacy.” In this 
shareholder-oriented model, “the managers of the corporation should be 
charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of 
its shareholders; [while] other corporate constituencies, such as 
creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers, should have their 
interests protected by contractual and regulatory means . . . .”199 
While the debate about whether corporate managers should prioritize 
the interests of the shareholders over the interests of other constituencies 
or should have discretion to balance interests as they see fit has occupied 
copious quantities of academic literature,200 its impact on the practical 
workings of corporate law has been remarkably small. Even the 
strongest legal pronouncements of a shareholder primacy norm 
immediately defang the obligation by granting managers wide discretion 
to balance interests as they see fit.201 All that is required is that someone 
(including, if necessary, the court) conjure up an imaginative theory 
under which, in the long, long run, the shareholders will be better off by 
virtue of the immediate favoring of other interests.202 Conversely, 
outside the context of creditor protection in corporations facing 
insolvency, one would be hard pressed to find in any nation—except the 
Netherlands203 —a judicial decision holding that directors breached a 
legal duty by favoring shareholders over other stakeholders in the 
                                                     
197. E.g., Dodd, supra note 68, at 1147–48. 
198. E.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 276–87 (1999). 
199. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 440–41. 
200. E.g., Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 641 (2011) (addressing the 
question of whose interests should take priority); Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private” 
on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 72, 86 (2008); Milton Friedman, The 
Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profit, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Sept. 
13, 1970, at 17; Blair & Stout, supra note 198. See also generally Dodd, supra note 68; Berle, supra 
note 68, at 1367–68. 
201. E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
202. E.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing 
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 775 (2005). 
203. E.g., Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Corporate Governance: The Dutch Experience, 16 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 69–70 (2002) (describing authority of Dutch worker councils to challenge 
decisions by corporation management before a specialized court in Amsterdam). 
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company.204 
Hansmann and Kraakman are hardly alone in failing to focus on the 
objectively important—as opposed to the academically interesting—in 
addressing convergence. As discussed earlier,205 LLSV picked a number 
of laws, presumably based upon their reading of legal scholarship, in 
order to test whether so-called minority shareholder protections impact 
the distribution of stock in large corporations. Yet careful analysis would 
suggest that many of the laws they picked, such as cumulative voting, do 
little to protect minority shareholders in public corporations.206 
B.  The Tough Policy Issues 
Whether based upon an economic model that treats the corporation as 
a species of the principal-agent problem requiring the control of agency 
costs,207 or whether based upon the history of corporations since the 
South Sea Bubble of the early 1700s208 constituting a string of scandals 
in which those in charge of corporations fleeced their shareholders,209 
theory and history establish that a major concern of corporate law is to 
protect shareholders from those in control of the corporation. This 
concern with protecting shareholders is far more central to corporate law 
than the goal of protecting others impacted by corporate managers. For 
one thing, laws seeking to protect non-shareholders typically do not 
involve corporate law or may only involve corporate laws of limited 
geographic reach (as with co-determination). Also, such laws may deal 
with only narrow aspects of corporate law (as with laws designed to 
                                                     
204. The other components of Hansmann and Kraakman’s standard shareholder-oriented model 
are that ultimate control over the corporation should be in the hands of the shareholder class; that 
non-controlling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of 
controlling shareholders; and that the principal measure of the interests of the publicly traded 
corporation’s shareholders is the market value of their shares in the firm. The first and second of 
these three components are not new points of convergence; indeed, they have a sort of “well duh” 
quality. The third of these components has been rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876–78 (Del. 1985)—and, needless to say, the pronouncements of the 
Delaware Supreme Court can hardly be ignored in any discussion of convergence in the law of 
publicly held corporations. 
205. See supra text accompanying note 140.  
206. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text. 
207. E.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
208. See, e.g., EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 58–95 (1999) (describing the South Sea Bubble of the 1700s). 
209. See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text (describing history of corporate scandals 
following deregulation resulting in losses to investors and the resulting increase in regulation to 
protect shareholders). 
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protect creditors210). Finally, concerns about protecting non-shareholders 
through corporate law are commonly more theoretical than practical in 
their impact (as with the debate over shareholder primacy and directors’ 
duties). By contrast, laws seeking to protect shareholders are universal 
among jurisdictions and significantly impact most aspects of corporate 
law.211 
Yet it is not merely the pervasiveness of shareholder protection in 
corporate law that renders shareholder protection an appropriate focus 
for a discussion of convergence. The very difficulty in crafting effective 
protections for shareholders necessitates comparative law analysis—
after all, there is no sense in spending much time comparing how various 
nations handle the easy issues with obvious answers. Unfortunately, 
devising effective means of protecting shareholders has proven to be an 
intractable challenge—meaning that the end of history for corporate law 
will probably be the day before the Messiah arrives or the universe ends. 
In the meantime, we should not expect a stable convergence around the 
two fundamental questions that must be answered in addressing the 
protection of shareholders from those controlling the corporation. 
1. Mandatory Versus Permissive Corporate Law 
As discussed earlier,212 one of the enduring cycles in corporate law is 
the moving convergence on the balance between regulation and 
deregulation in the protection of minority shareholders. Hence, one does 
not need familiarity with the voluminous academic literature addressing 
the topic213 to recognize the critical importance of the debate over 
whether corporate law protections of minority shareholders should be 
mandatory or left for the participants to work out. 
                                                     
210. For a discussion of the primary approaches taken by corporate laws in different nations to 
protect creditors from the dangers created by limited liability, see GEVURTZ, supra note 18, at 33–
41. 
211. See infra text accompanying notes 237–255 (discussing divergent approaches to corporate 
law in different nations).  
212. See supra text accompanying notes 87–108 (describing cycles of regulation and 
deregulation). 
213. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW 185 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Symposium on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (containing a number of leading articles on the topic); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary 
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); James J. Hanks, Jr., 
Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and 
Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988).  
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The competing tensions here are ideological, political, and practical. 
The ideological disagreements over mandatory versus permissive 
corporate law rules reflect differing factual assumptions about the 
rationality of individuals, i.e., whether people act as rational wealth-
maximizing individuals or whether they act on irrational behavioral 
impulses.214 The ideological disagreements also reflect different 
assumptions about the efficiency of markets215 and the capability of 
government to avoid inefficient rent-seeking by public officials and 
other interest groups.216 Finally, they reflect a philosophical 
disagreement about the intrinsic value of individual autonomy.217 
The earlier discussion about cycles of regulation and deregulation 
illustrates the political tensions that prevent stable convergence 
regarding mandatory versus permissive corporate law.218 Corporate 
managers, for obvious reasons, are generally resistant to regulation that 
would limit their autonomy. Furthermore, unless a crisis looms, there 
may be little push by shareholders for mandatory protections because 
shareholders may underestimate the danger and overestimate their ability 
to protect themselves.219 The prospect of regulatory arbitrage—forming 
the corporation under more relaxed laws—creates special pressure for 
deregulation in the corporate arena.220 
The increasing numbers of American and foreign limited liability 
companies organizing under Delaware law while operating largely or 
exclusively outside of Delaware221 highlight the political forces behind 
deregulation. The Delaware limited liability company statute expressly 
sets forth a policy maximizing freedom of contract and allowing 
                                                     
214. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1053 (2000); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). 
215. Compare Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998), with Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989). 
216. E.g., Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market, 16 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 111, 115–16 (2002). 
217. See, e.g., David Crossley, Paternalism and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 J. BUS. 
ETHICS, 291 (1999). 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 87–108. 
219. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 215, at 1474–80 (discussing problems with shareholder 
consent to fiduciary duty waivers). 
220. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
221. E.g., Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies 
Formed: An Empirical Analysis 2, 8 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper 
No. 126, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633472. 
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elimination of every fiduciary and other duty except the basic duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.222 This law has been one of the main drivers 
of decisions by out-of-state limited liability companies to organize under 
Delaware law.223 
Another and earlier example comes from the 1980s. In response to a 
highly controversial Delaware Supreme Court decision finding that 
directors had breached their duty of care,224 Delaware enacted a striking 
example of permissive legislation in corporate law. The legislature 
amended Delaware’s corporate statute to allow provisions in certificates 
of incorporation that waive monetary liability for directors who breach 
their duty of care.225 Demonstrating convergence in action, this scene 
later replayed itself in Japan in the 1990s. Following a huge damage 
award against directors of a Japanese bank who breached their duty of 
care, the Japanese legislature enacted a provision allowing corporate 
charters to limit the amount of damages for which directors can be 
liable.226 
As explained earlier, however, these political winds can blow in both 
directions, thereby preventing a permanent convergence in favor of 
deregulation. Ever since the South Sea Bubble, waves of corporate 
scandal and crisis have caused large losses for shareholders and 
triggered broader economic dislocation. The result—from the English 
Bubble Act’s attempt to prevent joint-stock companies without official 
charter, from issuing transferable shares,227 to the mandatory corporate 
governance provisions in the Sarbanes–Oxley228 and Dodd–Frank229 
Acts—is a political backlash against deregulation and an adoption of 
mandatory shareholder protections.   
Finally, what frustrates permanent convergence is the simple fact that 
both regulation through mandatory protections and deregulation through 
                                                     
222. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18–1101 (2011). 
223. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(finding from a survey of attorneys whose clients formed limited liability companies (LLCs) that the 
Delaware freedom of contract provision was one of the most frequently cited reasons for 
establishing LLCs under Delaware law). 
224. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). 
225. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
226. E.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Learning from Comparative Law in Teaching U.S. Corporate Law: 
Director’s Liability in Japan and the U.S., 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 213, 232 (2003). 
227. E.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 21–22. 
228. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes–Oxley) Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
229. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
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contractual freedom have merits and flaws. Practically speaking, finding 
the “Goldilocks” balance between bust-producing deregulation230 and 
growth-stifling regulation231 has not been an easy undertaking. 
2. Authority Versus Accountability for Corporate Managers 
Drawing on the organizational theories of Kenneth Arrow,232 Stephen 
Bainbridge has crystallized a second fundamental tension in corporate 
law: the tension between the authority and accountability of those in 
charge of the corporation.233 Specifically, in order for any organization 
to function, members of the organization must be given some authority 
to act; if no one has authority to do anything, nothing gets done. The 
problem—which economists call the “principal-agent” or “agency cost” 
problem234—is that those with authority to act often misuse their 
authority. They may engage in disloyal conduct to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the organization or they may act honestly but 
misguidedly out of carelessness, bad judgment, or various biases and 
emotions. As expressed in an old cliché instead of the language of 
economics, because humans are inherently fallible, “power corrupts.” 
Hence, there is need for mechanisms of accountability, lest authority 
devolve into the corruption that results from absolute power. 
The tension begins with the fact that mechanisms of accountability 
necessarily impinge on authority. This fact is particularly evident when 
the mechanism involves a requirement of advance approval. Even when 
the mechanism involves only after-the-fact consequences, however, the 
fear of such consequences can reduce the willingness to exercise 
authority. This may deter desirable as well as undesirable acts.235 The 
real problem, however, is not simply that accountability limits authority; 
it is that mechanisms of accountability generally are not self-executing. 
Instead, fallible human beings carry out the accountability mechanisms, 
whether this involves selecting those who will have authority, approving 
specific actions, or deciding if authority has been misused. Hence, 
accountability mechanisms essentially transfer authority from one 
                                                     
230. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (describing bust-producing deregulation). 
231. E.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 653–57 (describing problems of overregulation of financial 
markets in French and German history). 
232. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
233. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 252–53 (2002). 
234. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 207. 
235. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care 
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 963–64 (1990). 
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person to another person or group. These transferees, however, may 
themselves have poor motives or act misguidedly. Of course, one could 
have other persons impose accountability upon the persons who impose 
accountability, but then, given this logic, one must repeat this process 
endlessly. 
At this point, one could throw up one’s hands and decide that the 
whole enterprise of imposing accountability is pointless. Corporate law, 
however, is built on the notion of finding some balance. The difficulties 
and disagreements inherent in finding the appropriate balance suggest 
that this will be an area of divergence or constantly shifting 
convergence. 
We can find examples of these disagreements in the various 
mechanisms of accountability, including selection, approval, and 
consequences. Recently in the United States, disagreements about 
accountability through selection have played out in the controversy over 
“proxy access,” which refers to the right of shareholders in public 
companies to demand that shareholder nominees for board positions 
appear on the proxy form distributed by the corporation to its 
shareholders. While this would seem to be an elementary exercise in 
democratic governance, critics of proxy access have highlighted 
conflicts of interest and misguided motives among shareholders 
demanding proxy access.236 In other words, critics have pointed to the 
fallible nature of those who would monitor others through the 
mechanism of selection.237 
Actually, proxy battles for control of publicly traded companies are 
not major drivers of accountability because they rarely occur.238 Of far 
more significance is the threat of a change in management following a 
corporate takeover.239 Corporate laws in different nations diverge in the 
manner they govern such acquisitions and management’s efforts to 
thwart them. Indeed, an attempt to harmonize corporate takeover laws in 
Europe provoked so much controversy that the resulting European 
                                                     
236. E.g., Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director 
Nominations by Shareholders (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm; 
Jesse Westbrook, SEC Delays Proxy-Access Rules Amid Legal Challenge, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2010, 5:34 PM EDT), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-
04/sec-delays-proxy-access-rules-amid-legal-challenge.html. 
237. E.g., Lynn A. Stout, Corporations Should Not Be Democracies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, 
at A17. 
238. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682–
83 (2007) (reporting the small number of contested proxy solicitations). 
239. E.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 115–17 (1965). 
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Union harmonizing directive allows member nations to opt out of key 
provisions.240 This is yet another example of the difficulties of balancing 
authority and accountability between managers (who have an interest in 
preserving their positions)241 and shareholders (who face collective 
action problems in deciding whether to sell).242 
The dilemma of how to balance authority and accountability also has 
produced disagreement among nations about requirements for 
shareholder approval of management actions and shareholder ability to 
command management actions.243 Shareholders in many nations possess 
more power in these areas than they do the United States.244 
There is also marked divergence in approaches to achieving 
accountability by imposing liability on managers for disloyal or ill-
advised decisions. In some instances, this divergence is subtle and even 
concealed under an apparent convergence. For example, the doctrine 
known as the “business judgment rule,” which apparently originated in 
the United States,245 has spread worldwide.246 This doctrine calls for 
restraint in imposing liability upon directors for disinterested decisions 
that turn out badly or with which some shareholders may disagree.247 
Hence, at first glance, this would appear to represent an important 
example of convergence on the fundamental question of balancing 
authority and accountability through judicial review of business 
                                                     
240. E.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: 
Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L. L. REV. 171, 212 (2006). 
241. E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 181. 
242. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for 
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 256–64 
(1989) (discussing coercive tender offers).  
243. E.g., Enriques et al., supra note 78, at 72–74. 
244. Id. Compare CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238–39 (Del. 2008) 
(limiting ability of shareholders to command substantive business decisions through bylaw 
amendment), with AktG § 83 (giving shareholders authority to command management board of 
German public company to handle matters within shareholder competence), and AktG § 118 (listing 
matters within shareholder competence, including amendment of articles), and AktG § 174 
(conferring on shareholders the authority to determine dividends). 
245. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77–78 (La. 1829). 
246. E.g., Peoples Dep’t Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, para. 64 (Can.) 
(describing the adoption of the business judgment rule in Canada, the U.K., Australia and New 
Zealand); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 21, 1997, 175 Entscheiungen 
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 135 (244) (F.R.G.) (the ARAG/Garmenbeck case) 
(describing adoption of business judgment rule in Germany); Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. 
Ct.] Sept. 16, 1993, 1469 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 25 (Ikenaga v Tabuchi) (invoking business 
judgment rule in Japan); Hopt, supra note 195, at 39 (describing introduction of business judgment 
rule in Switzerland, Japan, Germany, Portugal, Australia, and Denmark). 
247. E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 286. 
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decisions. 
A closer examination of case law, however, reveals that a rule calling 
for restraint in second-guessing board decisions may be applied very 
differently in different legal cultures.  For example, a few years ago, 
Delaware judges applied the business judgment rule in a highly 
deferential manner to exonerate directors who had approved payment of 
$130 million to the fired former president of a company after a one-year 
term in which he accomplished very little.248 At around the same time, 
German judges found a breach of duty, despite applying the business 
judgment rule, by nitpicking at the decision of the directors of a German 
company to award a bonus of $17 million to the outgoing CEO, whose 
actions had played an important role in gaining over $50 billion for the 
company’s shareholders.249 
Such differences in attitudes may both reflect and reinforce important 
societal differences whose significance would be masked if one only 
paid attention to the apparent convergence marked by both courts’ 
purported decision to apply the business judgment rule. There is a wide 
gulf between executive compensation levels in the United States and in 
the rest of the world, whether measured in absolute terms or in terms of 
comparison with the ordinary workers of the company.250 Executive 
compensation levels in the United States have grown dramatically in the 
last thirty years and contribute to the growing income gap in the United 
States between the top one percent of earners and everyone else.251 
Unless there is convergence in broader national attitudes regarding the 
importance of equality in wealth distribution,252 one cannot expect 
                                                     
248. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del. 2006). 
249. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, - 3 StR 470/04, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 522 (F.R.G.) (the Mannesmann Case). For a discussion of the 
different judicial attitudes revealed in the Disney and Mannesmann opinions, see Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453 (2007). 
250. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 331 n.86 (2004) (contrasting compensation gaps in the 
United States and other developed nations); Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing and Beyond: 
Implications for Workers, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 815, 829 n.63 (2002) (citing more articles that 
discuss the growing gap between executive and worker pay in the United States). 
251. E.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 39, 46, 61–66 
(2010); Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Banana Republic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at WK10. 
252. E.g., David Brooks, The American Way of Equality, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 4 
(reviewing the work of sociologist Seymour Lipset, whose studies of American exceptionalism 
highlight the willingness of Americans to accept income inequality, in contrast with citizens of other 
western societies); Umfrage: Gerechtigkeit vor Freiheit, ZEIT ONLINE, TAGESSPIEGEL (Dec. 2, 
2006), http://www.zeit.de/news/artikel/2006/12/02/83097.xml (reporting on a survey by the German 
newspaper Welt am Sonntag that found that a majority of Germans (fifty-eight percent versus thirty-
four percent) prefer “social justice”—i.e., income equality—to economic freedom). 
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convergence in the application of even nominally similar corporate laws 
addressing the balance of authority versus accountability in executive 
compensation. 
Finding the balance between authority and accountability becomes 
even more difficult when one considers the process for enforcing 
liability upon corporate managers. The problem is that the concept of 
authority calls for managers to decide if the corporation should enforce 
claims against the managers themselves. Accountability is only 
achieved, however, if someone else makes enforcement decisions. Yet 
any other decision maker faces potential problems of suspect motives or 
significant costs (often paid by the corporation) in order to determine 
whether liability (or even further investigation) is warranted.253 
Interestingly, there has been a growing convergence in this area. 
Many civil law nations have begun to recognize derivative suits brought 
by shareholders on the corporation’s behalf against its directors while 
also subjecting such suits to minimum shareholding requirements for 
standing and perhaps to judicial preclearance of the merits of the 
action.254 At the same time, the United States, which apparently 
pioneered the derivative suit,255 has seen various efforts to curb such 
litigation, especially by turning the requirement that the plaintiff make a 
                                                     
253. See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better 
Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 265 (1985) 
(addressing the dilemma of who (among disinterested directors, plaintiff shareholder, shareholder 
majority, or the courts) should determine whether a lawsuit against directors is in the corporation’s 
best interest). 
254. Under a 2005 German amendment, stockholders with one percent or 100,000 euros’ worth 
of the outstanding stock can bring a lawsuit on the corporation’s behalf if evidence justifies the 
suspicion of illegal activities or a serious violation of the law or articles. Shareholders must first 
make a demand upon the board, and the court may dismiss the suit if the board can show the court 
that not suing would be in the overriding interest of the company. AktG § 148; see also Gōngsī Fǎ 
[Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Tenth 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 152–153, translated in iSinoLaw 
(P.R.C.) (authorizing shareholders with one percent of the stock to demand the company sue a 
director or executive who violates the law or articles and causes the company losses, or to institute a 
suit if the demand is not met); Klaus J. Hopt, Shareholder Rights and Remedies: A View from 
Germany and the Continent, 2 CO. FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 261, 273 n.60 (1997) (reporting that 
derivative suits have become available to holders of at least one percent or 50 million Belgian francs 
worth of stock in Belgium); Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The 
Recent Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective 
Regulatory Competition, 40 TEX. INT’L L. J. 113, 140–41 (2004) (describing a 1998 change in 
Italian law that allows derivative suits by shareholders with at least five percent of the corporation’s 
outstanding stock). 
255. See generally Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) (example of early U.S. derivative 
suit); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855) (same); see also CONARD, supra note 3, at 402 
(discussing historical barriers to derivative suits outside the United States). 
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pre-suit demand upon the board into a judicial preclearance of the merits 
of the suit.256 Still, this convergence may simply reflect unsatisfactory 
compromise in the face of intractable problems with the mechanisms for 
enforcing liability upon corporate managers. 
In the end, the balancing of authority and accountability, like the 
balancing of permissive and mandatory protections for shareholders, 
defies stable and complete convergence. This is the expected result in 
areas in which there are significant policy tensions and no easy 
solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether expressly stated or left implicit, a normative agenda 
underlies the predictions of convergence: if convergence is going to 
happen anyway because of efficiency, then nations should embrace 
convergence.257 Depending upon the nation of the writer, this translates 
into support of legal exports (you should adopt my nation’s corporate 
laws) or of legal imports (we should adopt another nation’s corporate 
laws). 
The theses developed here are intended to prevent an unexamined 
acceptance of such arguments. Convergence through imitation and 
transplant is constantly occurring in corporate law, but the points upon 
which corporate laws converge commonly represent only temporary way 
stations from which divergence will reappear until there is convergence 
again at a new point of temporary consensus. Corporate laws do not 
necessarily converge to more efficient or otherwise normatively superior 
points, but are influenced by fads and fashions, erroneous assumptions 
about correlation and causation, and rent-seeking by those favored by 
the particular points of convergence. This lack of permanent 
convergence is particularly likely in the difficult contexts of balancing 
regulation and deregulation or authority and accountability with respect 
to shareholder protection. 
This is not to say that observing other nations’ corporate laws is 
useless or unwise. If nothing else, we will learn that there are alternate 
approaches which may be as effective as our own. We may also learn, 
however, that when it comes to the really tough issues, no nation has a 
                                                     
256. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984) (holding that in order to excuse 
demand before filing a derivative suit, the plaintiff must plead with particularity facts that raise a 
reasonable doubt that the directors are disinterested and independent, or that their decision 
otherwise comes within the business judgment rule). 
257. E.g., Gugler et al., supra note 2, at 149–50; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 468. 
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good solution—which is why these are the really tough issues in 
corporate law. 
 
